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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of partisan political connections and ethnic tribalism 
on firm performance in a hyper-partisan political environment. Although existing literature 
generally shows that political connections improve firm performance, we argue that under 
the theory of electoral competition, political connections can be a double-edged sword 
because of the tension of partisan politics. Hence, we expect that changes in government 
can affect firm performance. Using a unique dataset from Nigeria, we find that political 
connections are valuable when a firm’s patron party is in power, whereas they are detri-
mental to firm value when their patron party is in opposition. Furthermore, we find that 
CEO ethnic tribal affiliation with the President improves firm performance even when the 
firm’s patron party is in opposition. This paper extends the literature on political connec-
tions and helps managers and policymakers understand the timely use of political connec-
tions in a hyper-partisan environment.
Keywords Partisan politics · Political connections · Tribalism · Firm performance
JEL Classification G30 · G32 · G34 · G38
1 Introduction
Building political ties are almost inevitable for the continued survival of companies in 
developing countries because of the power and control politicians have on scarce resources. 
However, political connections can be a double-edged sword, especially in a highly corrupt 
and hyper-partisan political environment (Shleifer and Robert 1994; Faccio 2006; Leuz and 
Oberholzer-Gee 2006; Ang et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2017; Belghitar et al. 2019). On the one 
hand, political connections with a party in government give firms easier access to loans, 
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tax avoidance, and high-profile publicity. On the other hand, firm performance can be jeop-
ardized due to elimination strategy and restriction to vital resources if the firm is connected 
to a political party that is in opposition at the time.
Despite the contrasting arguments for political connections and firm value/performance, 
existing literature has generally concluded that political connections have a positive impact 
on firm performance without considering the partisan affiliation of the firms. We argue 
that the partisan affiliation and the effect of political connections in developing countries 
with a high partisan political environment are worth exploring for the following reasons. 
First, in developing countries, resources are predominately owned and controlled by people 
who have political power. Hence, business transactions are not about the quality of the firm 
involved but designed around people who hold power to influence. This is even worse in 
countries with a high level of corruption where everything can be done outside the law. 
Second, due to the dominance of government involvement in the economy, the private sec-
tor is weak; hence, the government is the major consumer in the market (Deloitte 2014). As 
such, government business and contracts provide more revenue to firms than revenue from 
individual consumers. Even foreign contracts and development programs are awarded to 
firms through the incumbent government. Third, a political party is a team of politicians 
whose primary goal is to win electoral office (Bawn et al. 2012). By virtue of their descrip-
tion, politicians are very competitive and even willing to do anything to stay in electoral 
office, including sabotaging the performance of firms associated with the opposition party. 
This vote-seeking behaviour of political parties is well enshrined in Downs’s (1957) theory 
of electoral competition. Not only does the party in government have power and control 
over resources, but most deals and contracts are also awarded with political motives.
In a highly partisan political environment, the party in power uses all means to threaten 
the survival of the opposition party. This includes but is not limited to negatively impacting 
businesses that support or align themselves with the opposition party. Some of the com-
mon strategies are: terminating contracts prematurely, delaying payment to the firm, unnec-
essary probing into firms’ activities, and restricting access to foreign currency and foreign 
contracts. Anecdotal evidence suggests that under the terms of the People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP) of Nigeria in government, they restricted the issue of foreign currency for 
importing firms that did not have a significant connection to PDP. Such actions of weaken-
ing the opposition party can have a negative influence on firms that support the opposition 
party. Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) find that it is more difficult for firms to build con-
nections with the government when their patron party falls from power. Hence, these firms 
aligned with the opposition party underperform. The combining effect of these unique 
characteristics of developing countries suggests that the performance of politically con-
nected firms (PCC) is likely to vary dramatically over time, depending on the political for-
tunes of its patron party, making such connections riskier.
Due to the dominance of tribalism in developing countries, we extend the existing lit-
erature by considering the impact of ethnic tribalism on partisan politics and firm perfor-
mance in Nigeria. Juma (2012) argues that leaders of political parties focused on pursuing 
tribal interests. Even in the era of democracies, many African countries have reverted to 
tribal identities as foundations for political competition. Hence the significance of tribal 
connection cannot be underrated, especially in the political environment of most African 
countries. We argue that the tribal factor is one of the principal variables that often define 
political contestations in most electoral democracies, especially in Nigeria. More often 
than not, the ethnic tribes connected to the political party in government get a soft landing 
in making business decisions through loans, licenses, contracts, and tax holidays. The cor-
ruption level, economic significance, ethnic tribalism, and partisan political environment 
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make Nigeria a suitable setting for investigating the impact of partisan politics on firm 
performance. Prior literature asserts that political connections are more valuable in highly 
corrupt countries. Nigeria is among the most corrupt countries, scoring 27/100 in the 2018 
corruption index (Transparency International 2019). The 2018 Best Countries Rankings 
from U.S. News and World Report similarly rates Nigeria as the most corrupt country in 
the world. Although Nigeria is a highly corrupt country, it is the biggest and fastest grow-
ing economy within the Sub-Saharan Africa region. According to the 2018 U.S. News 
and World Report, Nigeria is one of the top four African countries for engaging in busi-
ness, number one for entrepreneurship, and ranked among the top four for movers (up and 
coming economies) in Sub-Sahara. It is the biggest middle-income consumer market in 
Africa (AfDB 2019) and is the second country with more successful domestically owned 
listed firms. According to PWC Nigerian economic outlook, Nigeria is recovering at a 
faster rate after negative growth in 2016.
Ideally, political parties are prerequisites for modern elections and are established to 
create a competitive ideology, which is vital for democracy and development (Ujo 2001). 
However, Balewa (1994) argues that the role of partisan politics is not fully understood in 
most African countries like Nigeria in particular. Hence, partisan politics frustrates devel-
opment and growth. In a bid to gain power, political parties do everything possible to their 
opponent, regardless of the rule of law. This is especially true as partisan politics is seen as 
a source of division in a country. Ezeani and Agudiegwu (2015) claim that even religion 
and ethnicity are clustered around political parties. For example, PDP is known to be for 
Christians and people from the South while All Progressive Congress (APC) is for Mus-
lims and people from the North.
Our results show that approximately 60% of the listed firms in Nigeria have political 
connections mostly with either PDP or APC, which are the two main parties that have 
ruled the country since 1999. As expected, we find that more firms are connected with PDP 
because it has been in government for a long time. However, there have been increasing 
connections with APC after its first federal election victory in 2015. Our results provide 
empirical evidence that partisan political connections are valuable only when the patron 
party is in government. Specifically, firms underperform when their connected political 
party is in opposition. Our results also indicate that having people from different politi-
cal parties provide continuous positive value even when there is a change of government. 
Regarding the impact of tribalism, we find that firms that are politically connected to the 
opposition party but have an ethnic tribal connection with the President through the CEO 
did not experience negative performance as compared to similar firms affiliated to the 
opposition party without ethnic tribal connections to the President. Our results are robust 
to alternative measures of political connections and firm performance. We also employ 
unbalanced panel data, two-stage least square (2SLS), the system generalized method of 
movements (GMM), and difference-in-differences (DID) to ensure our findings do not suf-
fer from self-selection bias, unobserved heterogeneity, and potential endogeneity issues.
This paper seeks to extend and make a number of new contributions to the existing lit-
erature on political connections and firm performance. First, compared with the extant lit-
erature, this paper considers an important factor (the partisan affiliation of the firms) that 
has been overlooked in prior literature and provides an understanding of why mixed results 
have been found in the existing literature. Our results show that political connections can 
have both positive and negative impacts on firm performance, depending on the timing and 
the status of its patron political party. To the best of our knowledge, our results provide the 
first empirical evidence that supports the double-edged argument on political connections. 
Second, our analysis illustrates why it is vital for firms to engage people from both sides of 
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the political spectrum to better harness the benefits of political connections. Practically, our 
results are consistent with Dangote Cement Limited’s political strategy of aligning with 
both APC and PDP when each party gains power. If knowing that the damage from los-
ing political connections sometimes is inevitable, it is vital to explore what could be done 
to protect firm value. We provide empirical evidence on how firms that are in opposition 
could minimize their damage by appointing a CEO whose tribal affiliation is the same as 
that of the President. Third, this paper is one of the few studies, if not the only study, that 
has extended the literature on political connections into partisan politics and specifically 
within the African setting. The corruption level, economic significance, ethnic tribalism, 
and partisan political environment make Nigeria a suitable setting for investigating the 
impact of partisan politics on firm performance. By doing this, we have provided evidence 
that supports the claim that countries with multiple parties’ democracy do not fully under-
stand partisan politics can be harmful (Belwa 1994).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 introduces the politics and 
tribalism in Nigeria. Section 3 reviews the literature and develops hypotheses. Section 4 
presents the research design. Section 5 presents and discusses our main results as well as 
robustness test results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2  Politics and tribalism in Nigeria
Nigeria, Africa’s most populous and oil-rich nation, is one of the most influential countries 
on the continent. Nigeria gained independence from Britain in 1960 and later became a 
republic in 1963. Democratic elections, coups, and counter-coups characterize the post-
independent history of Nigeria up until 1999 (Hanson 2017). Nigeria has had six success-
ful presidential and parliamentary elections since the fourth republic (1999–2019). These 
elections have been contested by different political parties but dominated by PDP and APC 
(Omodia 2010). The PDP was formed in 1997, has ruled for 16 years, and has had impacts 
on business activities. For instance, it is widely believed that PDP is connected to major 
businesses (Zenon Petroleum and Gas Ltd; and Global Fleet Group), and it has given them 
a soft landing in operating their business when PDP was in government. The PDP govern-
ment offered a ten-year tax holiday to Dangote cement factories in 2007, making Dan-
gote Cement Ltd the number one cement producer in Nigeria with over 65% market share 
(Adesunkanmi 2014).
The APC was formed through the alliance of Nigeria’s three biggest opposition parties 
and came into power in 2015. The APC government introduced the Presidential Enabling 
Business Environment Council (PEBEC) in August 2016 (Channel T.V. 2018), which gives 
the President the power to award contracts to anybody of choice. This implies that govern-
ments can easily award contracts to firms that are connected with them. For example, the 
APC government has awarded contracts to some firms, including Dangote Group, Lafarge 
Africa, Unilever Nigeria, Flour Mills, to invest in 19 road projects in Nigeria. There is a 
conspiracy that the two-business magnates Dangote–Dangote Group and Otedola—Zenon 
Petroleum and Gas Ltd, joined the Buhari second term campaign to maintain their rel-
evancy in the business circle.
Prior studies suggest that political connections are formed through owners/investors 
(Johnson and Mitton 2003), family (Fishman 2001), directors (Faccio 2006; Halford and 
Li 2019), and state enterprise (Wu et al. 2012a, b). However, in Nigeria, the common chan-
nel of forming political ties is through business owners and (or) family members becoming 
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politicians or former politicians investing or starting a business. Business owners engage 
in politics as party sponsors or electoral candidates of a political party. For instance, Femi 
Otedola was reported to have sponsored the re-election of Chief of Olusegun Obasanjo 
in 2003 and that pays his way by acquiring a stake in the Transcorp Hilton Hotel, Abuja 
(state-owned), through his appointment as the Chairman of Transcorp Hilton Hotel (Sahara 
Reporter 2006). Former politicians such as ministers and members of parliament also use 
their political influence to establish businesses, beginning with government contracts. 
Political connections through family ties are also very common in Nigeria. Family mem-
bers of incumbent politicians also benefit from tapping into the (politician) networks to 
grow the business. For example, Agha (2017) reported that Abdullahi Babalele’ son-in-
law to the former vice president- Atiku Abubakar, used the political influence of Atiku 
Abubakar to grow his company—Orlean Investment to clinch operating ticket in the Oil 
and Gas Free Zones Authority, making them among the top firms operating in the oil and 
gas industry in Nigeria (Agha 2017). Also, political connections in Nigeria are different 
from other emerging economies such as China, which is dominated by connections through 
state-owned enterprises (Wu et al. 2012a, b).
Like most African countries, Nigeria has diverse tribal groups, but three ethnic groups, 
namely Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba, have dominated politics and business. The Igbo ethnic 
group, which dominates the Eastern part of Nigeria, is perceived to align closely with the 
PDP party, whereas the Hausa in the North is known to be controlling the APC. Yoruba in 
the Western corridor is fairly divided between APC and PDP, with the majority in APC. 
This simply shows that tribal affiliations play a significant role in making informed deci-
sions. For instance, APC was formed from the regional parties; ACN predominately by 
Yoruba tribal and CPC, which is affiliated to Northern Nigeria and dominated by the Hausa 
tribe, have merited its followers to continuously preach for tribalism.
3  Literature review and hypotheses development
Previous studies suggest that political connections can be both beneficial and detrimental 
to firm performance. The argument in support of political connections can be linked to 
resource-dependency theory and resource-based theory. According to the resource-depend-
ency theory, a firm’s growth and survival are dependent on the external environment (Pfef-
fer and Salancik 1978). Hence, firms find ways to reduce the uncertainty of the external 
environment through political connections (Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Wong and Hooy 
2018). Politicians are perceived as having power and control over most of the resources 
of the external environment. Therefore, political connections provide firms access to vital 
resources to which the firm would not usually have had access.
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), firms affiliate with political actors to reduce 
dependencies on scarce resources controlled by external entities. Researchers have found 
that political connections are more valuable in the emerging economy because of the uncer-
tainty in the external environment (Mitchell and Joseph 2010; Guo et al. 2014). Empiri-
cal evidence shows that political connections facilitate the acquisition of scarce resources 
in the external environment through loans, government grants, and government contracts 
(Johnson and Milton 2003; Khwaja and Main 2005; Adhikari et  al. 2006; Faccio 2006; 
Faccio et al. 2006; Hillman et al. 2009; Boubakri et al. 2012; Hill et al., 2014; Tu et al. 
2013; Bona-Sánchez et al. 2014; Guo et al. 2014; Jackowiz et al. 2014; Yang et al. 2014; 
Halford and Li 2019). Wu et  al. (2012a, b) find that politically connected private firms 
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enjoy tax benefits. Still, in China, Tu et  al. (2013) show that political connections offer 
preferential treatment to acquirers in the privatization of state firms. Boubakri et al. (2012) 
show that politically connected firms have a lower cost of equity. Wu et al. (2018) also find 
that the CEO’s political connections increase firm performance in China.
In addition to connecting firms to scarce resources, politicians themselves are intangible 
resources because of their knowledge, experience with both local and foreign government 
procedures and policies under the resource-based theory (Agrawal and Knoeber 2001; Ang 
et al. 2013). Moreover, in developing countries, politicians are well-acclaimed and attract 
media attention. These intangible characteristics of politicians create a competitive advan-
tage for politically connected firms—PCC (McWilliams et  al. 2002; Wu et al. 2012a, b; 
Su et al. 2014). Prior research suggests that political connections have a positive impact 
on firm performance. For example, Goldman et  al. (2008) find that firms experienced 
abnormal stock returns following the announcement of the nomination of a politically con-
nected person on the firm’s board. Similarly, Fisman (2001) reveals that firms connected 
to the Suharto family lost value following several announcements regarding the poor 
health of Indonesian President Suharto (see also Faccio and Parsely 2007; Ferguson and 
Hans-Joachim 2008). Shin et al. (2018) also find that politically connected outside direc-
tors improve operating performance in Korean chaebol firms. Political connections reduce 
the negative impact of political conflict and firm-level cost of equity (Pham 2019). Faccio 
et al. (2006) suggest that political connections influence government financial assistance to 
distressed firms in developing countries. Halford and Li (2019) also report that politically 
connected firms are more likely to resolve distress outside of bankruptcy court.
However, political connections outside the government can be harmful to a firm under 
the vote-seeking behavior of Downs (1957) theory of electoral competition. According to 
Downs (1957) electoral competition theory, the actions of political parties are aimed at 
maximizing votes. Therefore, political parties engage in a "win power at all cost" com-
petitive philosophy, including sabotaging people and firms supporting the opposition party. 
Thus, in a hyper-partisan environment of developing countries, firms are likely to suf-
fer from the failure of their patron to secure power in an election. The party in power is 
expected to negatively target firms that support the opposition party as a strategy to cripple 
the activities of the opposition party. Following the electoral competition theory and its 
associated “win power at all cost” political philosophy, we argue that a political party in 
government will use an aggressive strategy to restrict access to vital resources that for-
mer government members used to have in order to cut the funding of the opposition party. 
This will have a negative impact on the firm because such politically connected firms were 
depending on those resources. Also, the party in government is likely to tarnish the image 
of the opposition party member through unnecessary and biased probing into the contracts 
of the former government. These activities are expected to have a negative impact on polit-
ically connected firms when their party is in opposition.
Furthermore, the government will channel resources towards its favoured firms, which 
leads to distortion of the market and misallocation of investments, making it harder for 
politically connected firms in opposition to survive (Shleifer and Robert 1994). For exam-
ple, Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) show that firms connected to a political party find it 
difficult to secure domestic funding when their political party lost power. Also, the govern-
ment can change the regulatory requirement to cause a negative impact on firms affiliated 
with the opposition party. As the government is the biggest consumer and client in devel-
oping countries, they can change their expenditure pattern by buying from foreign firms 
if the only local firm is connected to the opposition party. For example, Goldman et  al. 
(2008) show that people in government manipulate government contract systems against 
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firms connected to the opposition party. Besides, firms connected to the opposition party 
are likely to be a victim of resources exclusion, expropriation, and sabotage from sitting 
governments (Siegel 2007). For example, COMET Shipping Agencies Nigeria Ltd, South 
Atlantic Petroleum Limited (SAPETRO), and NetCom Development and Investment Lim-
ited owned by Theophilus Danjuma, a political alien to Atiku Abubakar (Presidential can-
didate—opposition party) reportedly financed the campaign of Atiku Abubakar in Taraba 
State, Nigeria. As a consequence of supporting the opposition party, COMET Shipping 
Agencies Nigeria Ltd lost its licenses for crude oil shipping (Sepetro 2019).
Drawing on the resource dependency theory, which implies the positive effect of politi-
cal connections, and the electoral competition theory, which suggests the negative effect of 
political connections, we hypothesize that:
H1: Political connections have a positive effect on firm performance when the patron 
party is in power and a negative effect on firm performance when the patron party is the 
opposition party.
It is obvious that tribalism, partisan politics, and business are scarcely separable in most 
developing countries and Nigeria in particular. Because there are fewer alternative ideolo-
gies in the politics of developing countries, politicians win votes on tribal lines (Schwarz 
1966). From pre-colonialization to date, ethnic tribes and languages have always been part 
of the decision-making in the country (Schwarz 1966; Mwakikagile 2001; Sklar 2004). 
Therefore, tribal factor is one of the principal variables that often define political contesta-
tions and business arrangements. These have been promoted by the constitution of Nigeria, 
where the federal character principles are well articulated, and recognized tribalism in the 
appointments into federal ministries, departments, and agencies (Idris et al. 2018).
Consequently, governments are formed on tribal tickets. Businesses compete for scarce 
resources and markets, where the government is the biggest supplier and consumer of the 
economy. On the positive side, the tribal factor within the APC-led Government had pro-
moted businesses within the tribe that dominate the party. For example, the chairman of 
Dangote Nigeria Ltd came from the Northern part of Nigeria, where the APC has domi-
nancy. Invariably, that counted in his favor with surge growth of the firms with many new 
plants situated in the northern part of the country (Dangote Rice mills Saminaka, Kebbi 
State, Nigeria) (VON, 2019). Similarly, the 16 years ruled by PDP have been character-
ized by tribal factors, most notably in the sharing of oil licenses, among others. For exam-
ple, The Heir Group, owned by Tony Elumelu, has been a beneficiary of oil license shar-
ing by the PDP-led administration (Owoeye 2018). In a nutshell, tribal factors more often 
than not only favor the political class that seeks the favor of the government. Such moves 
have had adverse effects on the economy as many businesses without government back-up 
end up going down, or reduce their activities due to strict policies. Firms, therefore, take 
advantage of any tribal connections with the President to improve their performance. Juma 
(2012) argues that leaders of political parties focused on pursuing tribal interests. Even in 
the era of democracies, many African countries have reverted to tribal identities as founda-
tions for political competition (Juma 2012). Therefore, support from a President to a firm 
lead by a tribal colleague may be seen by many as support for its ethnic group and hence 
win votes, even if the firm is not politically connected to the President’s party.
Although boards of directors are found to provide valuable resources to firms, the CEO 
is responsible for making strategic decisions to improve firm performance (Wu et al. 2018). 
Directors may come from different ethnic backgrounds and might not have a common 
decision; hence, a tribal connection between the CEO and the President is more relevant 
and important than other directors’ tribal connections. According to social identity theory 
(Tajfel et  al 1979; Tajfel 1982), individuals classify themselves and others into different 
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categories, including ethnicity, tribe, religion and may favor the members of their own 
group (i.e. same tribe) and have prejudice against the members of other groups (Hewstone 
et al 2002; Zoogah 2016). Fracassi and Tate (2012) report that CEOs are more likely to 
appoint directors who share the same tie with CEOs. Similarly, Balsam et al. (2017) find 
that indirect ties between CEOs and directors are positively associated with higher CEO 
compensation and lower CEO turnover. Furthermore, the major consumer in transitional 
economies like Nigeria is the government (Deloitte 2014), which is managed and directed 
by the President. As ethnic tribalism influences voting behavior, we expect that CEOs shar-
ing the same ethnic background with the President will mitigate the impact of political con-
nections on firms of the opposition party. Thus, incumbent Presidents are likely to favour 
firms that are managed by people of his/her tribe regardless of the political connections of 
the firm. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H2: Firms with political connections perform better if their CEOs share the same ethnic 
background as the President.
4  Research design
4.1  Data and sample
We select our sample from all publicly listed firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) 
from 2011 to 2018. After excluding firms with missing data, our final sample consists of 
144 firms yielding 1152 firm-year observations over eight years. Our sample period is 
unique because it covers two democratic elections (2011 and 2015). The 2015 election 
resulted in a change of government, which was very significant because it was the first 
time in 15 years the PDP had to hand over power to the opposition party. In fact, it was the 
first time Nigeria experienced a peaceful, democratic change of government since inde-
pendence. Hence, the sample period covers the PDP’s last government term (2011–2015) 
and APC’s first term (2015–2018). We limit the sample period to ensure the same years 
in government for both parties and to avoid the effect of any undemocratic interruptions 
such as coups on the results. Furthermore, due to the fact that there are a lot of missing 
data before 2011 and inadequate information on the variables of interest in databases, we 
hand-collected data from firms’ annual reports (Ntim and Soobaroyen 2013; Gyapong et al. 
2016), which were downloaded from company websites.
4.2  Regression model and variable measurement
We begin our analysis with a baseline model that tests the impact of political connections 
on firm performance regardless of the party is in power or opposition.
where FPit is a measure of firm performance using Tobin’s Q or Return on Assets (ROA). 
Political is political connections measured as the proportion of directors connected with a 
political party. Total Assets is the natural log of total assets, and Sales Growth represents 
the proportionate change in sales from year to year. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to 
(1)
FPit = a + 1Politicalit + 2TotalAssetsit + 3SalesGrowthit + 4Leverageit + 5BoardSizeit
+ 
6
NonExecutiveit + 7YearDummiesit + 8IndustryDummiesit + it
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total assets. Board Size is the number of directors on the board, and Non-Executive repre-
sents the proportion of non-executive directors on the board.
Next, we introduce an interaction term (X) between political connections (Political) and 
status of the connected party (PIP or OPP) to test our first hypothesis,
where X is an interaction term between Political connections (Political) and the status of 
the connected party, either the party is in power (PIP) = Political*PIP or the party is in 
opposition (OPP) = Political*OPP. PIP is equal to 1 if the connected party is power and 
0 otherwise. OPP is equal to 1 if the connected party is the major opposition party and 0 
otherwise. All other variables remain the same as defined in model 1.
In model 3, we introduce a three-way interaction term (Z) between political connec-
tions and tribal relationships with the President (Political*PIP*Tribalism) to test the sec-
ond hypothesis.
where Tribalism is a binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO of the firm comes from the 
same ethnic tribe of the sitting President and 0 otherwise, X is an interaction term between 
Political Connections (Political) and the status of the connected party; either the party is 
in power (PIP) = Political*PIP or the party is in opposition (OPP) = Political*OPP. Z is a 
three-way interaction term among Political*PIP*Tribalism. All other variables remain the 
same as defined in model 1.
4.2.1  Dependent variable
Prior studies use return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and stock returns to 
measure firm performance (Goldman et al. 2009; Ang et al. 2013; Wang et al. 2017, 2019), 
however Bhagata and Black (2002) argue that these measures are short-term and that does 
not capture the long-term value of political connections. Furthermore, Gyapong et  al. 
(2016) argue that ROA and ROE are subject to earnings management. Therefore, we use 
Tobin’s Q as the measure of firm performance. Tobin’s Q is measured by the ratio of the 
market value of equity, plus the book value of total debts to the book value of total assets. 
In addition, we use ROA as an alternative performance measure in the robustness tests.
4.2.2  Independent variables
Political connections (Political): Prior studies have articulated different ways through 
which firms are connected politically (Faccio 2006; Wong and Hooy 2018; Wang et  al. 
2017). Commonly among these are the board of directors’ connections, shareholding con-
nections, and family connections. Wong and Hooy (2018) found that connections through 
the board of directors and shareholders are more stable and beneficial to the firm than other 
connections through family members and business people. However, connections through 
directors provided resources, which directly increase firm value compared with the share-
holding connection, which provides a monitoring role for effective corporate governance. 
Also, it is difficult to identify the partisan political connections of shareholders because 
(2)
FPit = a + 1Politicalit + 2Xit + 3TotalAssetsit + 4SalesGrwothit + 5Leverageit + 6BoardSizeit
+ 
7
NonExecutiveit + 8YearDummiesit + 9IndustryDummiesit + it
(3)
FPit = a + 1Tribalismit+2Politicalit + 3Xit + 4Zit + 5TotalAssetsit + 6SalesGrowthit + 7Leverageit
+ 8BoardSizeit + 9NonExecutiveit + 10YearDummiesit + 11IndustryDummiesit + it
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such information is not publicly available. For these reasons, we measured political con-
nections through the board of directors, and our approach is consistent with Goldman et al. 
2008). We define that a director is politically connected if he or she is holding or has held 
a position such as the minister, federal or state member of parliament, national officer of a 
political party, or government appointee to national office. A politically connected com-
pany is a company with at least one politically connected director.
Data on political connections were derived from different sources including directors’ 
background in the annual report, the list of former members of parliament, ministers, and 
newswire. To ensure the accuracy of the classification of directors on political party ties, 
we sought clarity from political party officials on directors where we had any doubts. 
When measuring the extent of political connections in a company, we used the proportion-
ate measure of the number of politically connected directors as a percentage of the total 
number of directors. We also used the traditional binary coding of 1 if a company had at 
least one politically connected director or 0 otherwise as a robustness check.
Tribal connections (Tribalism): We measure tribal connections based on the ethnic back-
ground of the company CEO and that of the sitting President (Gross et al. 2016). Firms are 
coded 1 if the CEO is from the same tribe as the President and 0 otherwise. During the 
PDP’s last term (2011–2014), President Jonathan Goodluck is from Ijaw ethnic group in 
the Bayelsa State. Muhammed Buhari, the President during the 2015–2018 government, is 
from Hausa Fulani ethnic group in Kastina State.
4.3  Control variables
We controlled for other variables that may potentially impact firm performance following 
the prior studies (Ang et al. 2006; Boubakri et al. 2008; Wu et al. 2012a, b). Firm size is 
measured by the natural log of total assets (Total Assets), which is used to control for the 
effect of economies of scale. The free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen 1988) indicates that 
debt helps in monitoring the opportunistic behavior of management, thereby increasing 
firm performance (Ilyukhin 2015). This is especially true for developing countries where 
there is weaker shareholder protection. However, large debt can also negatively affect firm 
performance because of debt covenants and periodic repayments (Ilyukhin 2015). We use 
sales growth (Sales growth) measured by the yearly proportionate change in sales to con-
trol for the effects of different stages of the business life cycle. Prior studies have found that 
growth firms experience high performance (Lee and Blevins 1990; Ntim and Soobaroyen 
2013; Gyapong et al. 2016). We also control for corporate governance variables such as 
board size (Board size) and the number of non-executive directors (Non-executive).
5  Findings and discussion
5.1  Univariate analysis
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the full sample. The mean value of the firm per-
formance measured by Tobin’s Q is 1.452, with a minimum of 0.912, a maximum of 1.894, 
and a standard deviation of 0.815, indicating high variations of performance across the 
sample firms. The average political connections among the sample firms are about 20%, 
equivalent to 1–2 politically connected directors on corporate boards. However, the high 
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standard deviation indicates high variations as some firms have three politically connected 
directors, and others have none. The maximum of 0.653 for Political shows that some firms 
have more than half of their directors connected to politicians through different channels, 
especially firms with connections to multiple parties. The average board size is 9, with an 
average of 5 members being non-executive directors. Over the sample period, the firms had 
a mean of 30% growth in sales.
To investigate the distribution of politically connected firms, we classified the sample 
firms according to being connected with the party in power (PIP) or opposition party 
(OPP) in a particular year. Table 2 shows that out of 1152 firm-year observations, only 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics (full sample)
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the full sample. Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s 
Q—The ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of total debts to the book value of total 
assets. Return on Assets -The ratio of net profit before tax to total assets. Political—Proportion of directors 
who are affiliated with a political party. Total Assets—Total assets of the company measured in Billions of 
Nara. Sales Growth—Proportionate change in sales from year to year. Leverage—total debt to total assets. 
Board Size—Number of directors on the board. Non-executive—Number of non-executive directors on the 
board. Tribalism—It is a binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO of the firm comes from the same ethnic tribe 
of the President and 0 otherwise
Variable No. firms Mean Median Min Max SD
Tobin’s Q 144 1.452 1.400 0.911 1.894 0.815
Return on Assets 144 0.21 0.273 − 0.110 0.373 0.133
Political 144 0.202 0.151 0 0.653 0.354
Total Assets 144 415 843 0.500 5955 914
Sales Growth 144 0.304 0.262 − 0.092 0.531 0.104
Leverage 144 0.243 0.193 0 0.632 0.151
Board Size 144 9 7 5 17 3
Non-Executive 144 5 3 1 9 5
Tribalism 144 0.381 0.320 0 1 0.745
Table 2  The number of 
companies by partisan political 
connections
This table presents the number of companies and observations by par-
tisan political connection. NPCC—non-politically connected compa-
nies. PIP –companies connected to the party in power. OPP—compa-
nies connected to the main opposition party. Multiple—companies that 
have political connections with more than one political party
Year NPCC PIP OPP Multiple Total
2011 67 43 27 7 144
2012 64 45 28 7 144
2013 65 45 25 9 144
2014 62 45 29 8 144
2015 54 32 47 11 144
2016 52 35 46 11 144
2017 47 37 47 13 144
2018 48 43 41 12 144
Total 449 323 292 78 1152
 V. Tawiah et al.
1 3
449 firm-year observations (NPCC) did not have politically connected directors on their 
boards. The remaining firms had at least one director connected with one or more politi-
cal parties. It can be seen that 323 firm-year observations have a connection with PIP, 
while 292 firm-year observations are connected to the OPP. The significant increase of 
the firms connected with the OPP party from 2015 is because PDP, which has been in 
government for a long time (1999–2015), lost the election and became the opposition 
party. However, from 2011 to 2014, 5 firms connected to APC shifted to PDP by 2015, 
and 2 firms appointed PDP connected director in addition to having APC connected 
director. Between 2015 to 2018, when there was a change in government from PDP to 
APC, we found that 7 firms switched their political connection from PDP to APC while 
4 firms established multiple political connections with APC. Some firms previously 
affiliated with PDP gradually moved to APC. For example, Dangote, the founder of the 
Dangote group of companies, a premium sponsor of PDP, was announced to be a mem-
ber of the APC campaign advisory team in 2018 (The Africa Report 2015; Bloomberg 
2018). We also find that 78 firm-year observations had multiple connections with both 
PIP and OPP parties.
Table 3 presents the mean (median) statistics of the variables according to the sta-
tus of the political party connected with. The mean value of Tobin’s Q indicates that 
PIP (1.68) performed better than non-politically connected firms (1.32). However, the 
average performance of firms connected with OPP (1.22) is lower than non-politically 
connected firms (1.32), suggesting that firms underperform when their patron party falls 
from power. Both firm characteristics and governance structures reported in Table  3 
Table 3  T-test of the mean (median) difference by partisan political connections
This table presents sample distribution and T-tests by type of partisan connection. Variables are defined 
as follows: Tobin’s Q—The ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of total debts to the 
book value of total assets. Total Assets—Total assets of the company measured in Billions of Nara. Sales 
growth—Proportionate change in sales from year to year. Leverage—total debt to total assets. Board 
size—Number of directors on the board. Non-executive—Number of non-executive directors on the board. 
NPCC—non-politically connected companies. PIP—companies connected to the party in power. OPP—
companies connected to the main opposition party. MUT—companies that have political connections with 
more than one political party
Mean (Median) T-test results
Variable NPCC PIP OPP MUT NPCC vs. PIP NPCC vs. OPP PIP vs. OPP





















































































Observations 459 323 292 78 782 751 615
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indicate that they have similar features regardless of the political connections. We use 
a T-test of mean (median) difference to statistically check if the differences between 
variables of different status of political connections are significant. Table 3 shows that 
the mean differences of Tobin’s Q between non-political connected firms (NPCC) and 
PIP is highly significant. Similarly, the performance of firms connected to PIP and OPP 
are significantly different. Another significant difference between PIP and OPP is the 
growth in sales. PIP has higher sales growth than OPP because PIP can easily gain 
access to government contracts, which turn out to be the largest customer in most devel-
oping countries. The company size measured by Total Assets is similar for both PIP and 
OPP. These preliminary findings set the tone that the impact of political connection on 
firm performance depends on the status of the patron party, either as the party in power 
or the opposition party.
Table 4 contains the results for the test of multicollinearity from the Pearson correla-
tion matrix. The results do not suggest any high correlation among the variables of interest 
and indicate that there are no serious multicollinearity problems in our models (Liu et al. 
2014). We also test for other linear regression assumptions, such as autocorrelation, nor-
mality, homoscedasticity, and linearity. These tests do not indicate any possible violation of 
any of the linear assumptions. For brevity, these results are not reported.
5.2  Multivariate analysis
5.2.1  Baseline results
Previous literature suggests that firms differ from each other in terms of their organiza-
tional culture, complexity, and managerial talents (Guest 2009; Ntim and Soobaroyen 
2013); thus, the use of panel data has the advantage of mitigating individual heterogeneity 
(Baltagi 1998). Park (2011) argued that company-specific differences are best controlled 
if the appropriate panel data technique is performed. To choose the most suitable estima-
tion between pooled OLS and fixed effect/random effect, we performed both the Lagrange 
Table 4  Pearson correlation matrix
This table presents Pearson’s pairwise correlation among the variables. Variables are defined as follows. 
Tobin’s Q—The ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of total debts to the book value of 
total assets. Political—Proportion of directors who are affiliated with a political party. Total Assets—Total 
assets of the company measured in Billions of Nara. Sales Growth—Proportionate change in sales from year 
to year. Leverage—Total debt to total assets. Board size—Number of directors on the board. Non-execu-
tive—Number of non-executive directors on the board. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Tobin’s Q 1
2. Political 0.220** 1
3. Total Assets 0.141* 0.373* 1
4. Sales Growth 0.563*** 0.284** − 0.008 1
5. Leverage − 0.134* 0.111 0.270 0.211 1
6. Board Size 0.162 0.313* 0.261 0.070 0.280** 1
7. Non-Executive 0.009 0.280** 0.144 0.060* 0.214 0.445** 1
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Multiplier (L.M.) test (Breusch and Pagan 1980) and the Hausman (1978) test. Based on 
those two tests, we adopted the fixed effects model.
Table 5 presents the multivariate regression results of the impact of political con-
nections on firm performance. Column (1) shows the political connections, which is 
measured as the percentage of politically connected directors on the board, have strong 
predictive power in explaining the variation in firm performance. We obtained similar 
results when the political connection is measured as a binary variable (see Column 
(2) of Table 5). Both results indicate that political connections are statistically signifi-
cant in improving firm performance. We replace Tobin’s Q with ROA as an alterna-
tive measure of firm performance in the results of columns (3) and (4). The results 
are not statistically different from those of columns (1) and (2). Therefore, the results 
are robust to an alternative measure of political connection and firm performance. The 
results of the control variables are consistent with our expectations and prior studies. 
Table 5  Regression results on the 
impact of political connections 
on firm performance
This table presents the regression results of the overall impact of 
political connections on firm value. Political (%)—Proportion of direc-
tors who are affiliated with a political party. Political (Binary)—It is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if at least one director of the firm has politi-
cal affiliation with any party and 0 otherwise. Tobin’s Q—The ratio of 
the market value of equity plus the book value of total debts to the 
book value of total assets. Total Assets—Total assets of the company 
measured in Billions of Nara. Sales growth—Proportionate change 
in sales from year to year. Leverage—total debt to total assets. Board 
size—Number of directors on the board. Non-executive—Number of 
non-executive directors on the board. t-Statistics are shown in paren-
theses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively
Variable Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q ROA ROA

























































Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj-R 0.456 0.294 0.401 0.394
Observations 1152 1152 1152 1152
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For example, as predicted, company size and sales growth are positive and significant 
determinants of firm performance. Leverage, on the other hand, has a negative impact 
on firm value.
5.2.2  The impact of political connections conditioned on the status of the patron 
party
Table 6 reports the results of the impact of political connections conditioned on the sta-
tus of the patron party (PIP or OPP) on firm performance. We provide results across 
three different periods. Full sample period (2011–2018) in columns 1–3, the PDP term 
2011–2014 in columns 4–6, and APC term 2015–2018 in columns 7–9. Across all three 
different periods, our primary variable of interest is the interaction term (Political*PIP) or 
(Political*OPP). The overarching objective is to estimate the differences, if any, of politi-
cal connection to firm performance when the politically connected director’s party was in 
government and when in opposition.
Column (1) of Table 6 shows that firms connected to PIP experience more benefits as the 
coefficient of Political*PIP (0.121) is significant and greater than 0.032 of Political. Thus, 
directors who are connected to the PIP add more value to the firm than directors connected 
to other parties. In economic terms, all other things being equal, one director connected 
with the party in power will increase firm performance by 0.212 [(0.12*0.354/0.202)]1 or 
14.6% (0.212/1.452).
On the contrary, the results in Column (2) indicate that firms connected to OPP expe-
rience negative performance. The negative and significant coefficient of Political*OPP 
(−  0.016) compared with the positive and significant coefficient of Political (0.041) 
implies that when a firm’s patron party falls to the opposition, its performance starts to 
deteriorate. In economic terms, all other things being equal, a political connection to 
the opposition party through one director decreases the firm’s performance by 0.045 
[(0.098*0.354)/0.202] or 3.13% (0.045/1.452). In Column (3), we test whether having 
directors connected to different political parties add value to the firm. The results indicate 
that multiple political connections do improve firm performance (0.011) but at a marginal 
rate at the 10% significance level. Comparatively, multiple connections are better than no 
political connections and connections with the opposition party, but not better than a sin-
gle-party connection to the party in power. Arguably, multiple connections are too expen-
sive to keep because the firm needs to sponsor more than one party, and likely to result in 
a conflict of interest among politically connected directors. There is a potential conflict of 
interest because each party might not see the firm as a strong ally for better deals.
During the PDP government era (2011–2014) in Columns 4–6, we find that firms con-
nected to the party in power (PIP) (that is, firms connected with PDP) have a positive and 
significant impact on firm performance, which are similar to the results of the full sample. 
However, political connections had a significant and negative impact on firms connected 
with OPP (that is, firms connected with APC) during the same period when PDP was in 
government. Specifically, political connections increase firm performance by 13.5% if the 
company was connected to PDP (party in power). However, firms connected with APC 
(the opposition party) lost about 3.3% in value during the PDP government era. Moreover, 
during the APC government era in 2015–2018 (Columns 7–9), when APC took over power 
1 We follow Adhikari and Agrawal (2016) approach as follows: coefficient of political connection PIP 
(OPP)*standard deviation of political connection/mean of political connection.
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from PDP, we find that firms connected with the party in power (now the APC) enhance 
firm performance whereas firms connected with the opposition party (now the PDP) under-
performed. The findings suggest that in a highly partisan country, politically connected 
people have better access to resources when their party is in power. Another possible rea-
son why firms underperform when their patron party falls from power is that such firms 
may have sponsored their patron party with the expectation of getting good deals to offset 
its significant sponsorship when their patron gets elected. Such sponsorship can cripple the 
investment and working cash flow of the firm, especially when the patron does not win the 
election. Firms with connections with different parties had a significant value contribu-
tion from their politically connected directors. Thus, multiple-party connections have value 
relevance regardless of the party in government. Political connections with multiple par-
ties are likely to give firms continuous value with the government of the day. Overall, our 
results support  H1 that the impact of political connection varies depending on whether the 
party is in government or opposition during the period.
Although our empirical analysis shows that political connection is beneficial where the 
firm is connected to the party in power, it does not go without saying that political connec-
tion with any political party, regardless of its status, comes without costs. Obviously, been 
connected with a political figure comes at a price that can be monetary, non-monetary, or 
both. For example, connected firms are expected to sponsor the political campaign of their 
parties. These sponsorships require an outflow of a large sum of money. For example, The 
Africa Report (2015) claim that Skye Bank and its group of companies donated 1 billion 
Naira towards the PDP campaign in 2014. Firms in Nigeria do not disclose these contribu-
tions to political parties. Firms are likely to pay for directors, who might be too busy to 
attend meetings and monitor management. Politically connected directors are found to be 
busy, and hence their lack of attendance at meetings could impair the overall performance 
of the firm (Pascual‐Fuster and Crespí‐Cladera 2018). While it could be more informative 
to account for the busyness of directors in our model, there are no disclosures on the num-
ber of directorships in the annual reports or database. Regarding the non-monetary cost, 
in a hyper-partisan political environment, some political connection could lead to serotyp-
ing on the firms (Bianchi et al. 2013). Being known to be connected with the government 
might appear to many people as supporting the government agenda. Hence people who 
do not support the government might avoid the firm’s products and services. Also, a high-
level connection with the government could be interpreted as a breeding ground for corrupt 
contracts that might help tarnish the firm’s reputation (Jin et al. 2019). We acknowledge 
that the non-inclusion of these factors in our model could potentially bias our results. In 
the absence of accurate data and given the increasing number of firms’ connections with 
the party in power, we argue that the benefit of political connection with the party in power 
outweighs the cost.
5.2.3  Partisan politics and firm performance conditioned on tribalism
Given the tribal environment of Nigeria, we use CEO ethnic connections with the President 
of the country to estimate how firms use tribalism to their advantage. By doing this, we 
provide evidence of tribalism on firm performance. Second, we provide empirical findings 
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on how a company mitigates the downside of political connections through tribalism. Our 
sample provides unique settings for such analysis because there are two Presidents from 
two different ethnic backgrounds during the sample period. In the sample, 326 observa-
tions had a CEO with an ethnic group as the Presidents. 112 of these observations change 
their CEOs within 18 months following the change of government.
The results of the regression estimation are presented in Table 7. The coefficient of a 
three-way interaction term (Political*PIP*Tribalism) in Column (1) is significant and 
greater than a two-way interaction if a company’s patron party is in power (Political*PIP), 
implying that tribal connections provide an incremental contribution to firms on top of 
political connections. In economic terms, all other things being equal, the tribal connection 
Table 7  Regression results of partisan politics and firm performance conditioned on tribalism
This table presents the regression results of partisan politics and firm performance conditioned on tribalism. 
PIP –companies connected to the party in power. OPP—companies connected to the main opposition party. 
Tribalism—It is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is from the same tribe as the President and 0 other-
wise. Political—Proportion of directors who are affiliated with a political party. Political*PIP—interaction 
term between political connection and companies connected with party in power (PIP). Political*OPP—
interaction term between political connection and companies connected with opposition party (OPP). 
Political*PIP*Tribalism—a three-way interaction term between political connection and companies con-
nected with party in power (PIP) and tribalism. Political*OPP*Tribalism—a three interaction term between 
political connection and companies connected with opposition party (OPP) and tribalism. t-Statistics are 
shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respec-
tively
Full period 2011–2014 PDP term 2015–2018 APC term NPCC
Variable PIP OPP PIP OPP PIP OPP

































































Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R 0.372 0.318 0.396 0.399 0.365 0.378 0.294
Observations 1152 1152 526 526 576 576 449
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between the CEO and the President increases firm performance to 18.85% from 14.60% 
(see the economic significance of results in Table 6) in the case of firms connected to the 
party in power.2 Regarding firms connected to the opposition party, tribalism minimizes 
the decrease in performance from 3.13–0.5% (see the economic significance of results in 
Table  6). We observe a similar trend in the PDP term (2011–2014) in Column (3) and 
APC term (2015–2018) in Column (5). The results in Columns (3) and (4) indicate that 
firms connected to APC, which was the main opposition party, during the PDP term 
underperformed. However, firms connected with APC but had the CEO coming from the 
same tribe with President Goodluck (of PDP) experience positive performance. The same 
results can be found when firms connected to PDP (opposition party) during the APC term 
(2015–2018).
The results imply that firms politically connected to the opposition party but have a 
tribal connection with the President do not experience negative performance compared to 
other similar firms with the opposition party without tribal connections to the President. To 
put it differently, a firm connected with PDP performed fairly well under the APC era of 
2015–2018 if its CEO was from the Hausa Fulani ethnic group, which is the tribe of Presi-
dent Muhammed Buhari. The same can be found when firms connected with APC under 
President Goodluck Jonathan if the CEO is from the Ijaw ethnic group. Therefore, our 
results provide evidence supporting  H2 where politically connected firms perform much 
better if it has a CEO who shares the same ethnic background as the President, regardless 
of the status of the patron party. We, therefore, argue that firms that are in opposition could 
minimize their damage from political connections by appointing a new CEO whose tribal 
affiliation is the same as that of the President.
Although this paper focuses on firms with political connections, we perform additional 
analysis to test whether tribalism is beneficial to firms without political connections. The 
results are presented in column 7 of Table 7. The results show that the coefficient of Trib-
alism is positive and significant, which indicates that a firm’s tribal connection with the 
President can serve as a positive resource that enhances firm performance. In economic 
terms, all other things being equal, a tribal connection with the President can increase a 
firm’s performance by 2.15%. By extension, our results confirm our findings that a firm’s 
tribal connection can minimize the potential downside of political connection when the 
patron party falls to the opposition.
5.2.4  Endogeneity
First, to address the possible endogeneity concerns that may arise from omitted variable 
bias, two-stage least squares (2SLS) model has been estimated. In the first stage of the 
2SLS analysis, we estimated the factors that are likely to influence firms to appoint politi-
cally connected persons on board. We also considered factors that may attract politically 
connected persons to serve on the board of a company. These factors include the size 
(Total Assets), the profitability of the company (ROA), age (AGE), ownership structures 
(FORWN) of the company. Because firms benchmark their activities against other firms 
within the industries, the company’s decision to appoint a politically connected person is 
2 We follow the previous studies (Asongu and Nwachukwu 2018; Tawiah and Karungi 2020) to calcu-
late the net economic effect = [(mean of tribalism*interaction term + coefficient of political connection 
PIP(OPP)/mean of Tobin’s Q].
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Table 8  Endogeneity tests
This table presents the results of the endogeneity test. Columns 1 shows the first stage of the Two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) regressions. Columns 2 and 3 show the 2nd stage and GMM results. Columns 4 and 
5 report the results for the difference in differences regression. Column 4 is based on PDP-connected firms 
as the treatment against non-politically connected as the control group. Column 5 is based on PDP con-
nected as the treatment group against APC connected firms as the control group. In columns 6–7, we con-
trol for the effect of board members’ tribal connection with the President. Tobin Q is lagged by one year. 
FOROWN—the percentage of foreign ownership. INRatio—industry ratio of political connection. Age- age 
of the company; PPCB—the predicted value of political connection. DID—the interaction between Treat-
ment and Post-election. Treatment—It is a dummy variable equal to 1 for PDP connected firms and 0 for 
non-politically connected firms (in the case of column 5, Treatment is equal to 0 for APC connected firms). 
Post-election—It is a dummy variable equal to 1 for post-election (2015–2018) and 0 for years 2011–2014. 
Political—Proportion of directors who are affiliated with a political party. Political*PIP—interaction term 
between political connection and companies connected with party in power (PIP). Political*OPP—interac-
tion term between political connection and companies connected with opposition party (OPP). Board tribe 
is measured as the proportion of board members that share the same tribe with the President. t-Statistics are 
shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respec-
tively
Variable 1st stage 2SLS GMM DID DID Additional control
PIP OPP



















































Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R 0.476 0.382 0.325 0.265 0.291 0.266 0.287
Observations 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 115
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likely to be influenced by industry trends. Hence, we included the percentage of politically 
connected persons in the industry (INRatio) as a determinant in the first stage. We used the 
predicted variable (Predicted Pol) of the Political in the first stage as an instrumental vari-
able to estimate the value of political connections. As presented in Table 8, the results of 
the 2SLS estimations in Column (2) are significant and similar to the results in the baseline 
model of Table 6. The coefficient of the predicted variable (Predicted Pol.) is 0.012 and is 
significant at 1%. The results indicate that our findings are robust to potential endogeneity 
issues that might emerge from omitted variable bias and reverse causality.
Second, as politically connected persons are persons who have power as well as a rel-
evant network of resources, they are likely to choose to serve on better-performing firms. 
This creates self-selection bias and simultaneity issues where the dependent variables are 
simultaneously determined by the dependent variable (Wooldridge 2010). Thus, following 
prior studies, we adopted the system Generalized Method of Movement (GMM) (Wintoki 
et al. 2012; Ahmed et al. 2017) to address potential issues of simultaneity and reverse cau-
sality. The results reported in Column (3) of Table 8 are consistent with the main findings 
of a significant and positive impact of political connections on firm performance, indicat-
ing that the findings appear robust to possible simultaneity and reverse causality issues.
Next, we follow Wei et al. (2020) to employ the difference in difference (DID) estima-
tion to test the robustness of our findings of how a change in government affects the rela-
tion between political connections and firm performance. Our sample period, which covers 
the election year in 2015 and two different governments, allows us to use DID. DID is a 
widely used technique for examining the consequences of an event or policy change on an 
established relationship (Fang et al. 2014; Ahmed et al. 2017; Brogaard et al. 2017). Bro-
gaard et al. (2017) suggest that the DID estimation helps to reduce the impact of omitted 
variables and biases driven by the sample period. Following prior studies (Ahmed et  al. 
2017; Bogaard et  al. 2017), we created a variable Post-election with a value equal to 1 
for years 2015–2018 and 0 for years 2011–2014 (the election was held in the early part of 
2015, so we counted 2015 as the post-election year). We are interested in the performance 
of firms when their patron party loses power, so we designated firms connected to PDP3 
as the treatment group. We test the treatment group against control groups, namely non-
politically connected firms and APC connected firms, in two different regression models. 
Treatment group is equal to 1 for PDP firms and 0 for non-connected firms (or APC firms 
in Column 5 of Table 8). DID is an interaction between Treatment and Post-election. The 
statistically significant and negative coefficient of − 0.89 for DID in Column (4) of Table 8 
indicates that firms connected to a political party decrease performance after their patron 
party loses power compared with non-politically connected firms. Similarly, in Column (5) 
of Table 8, the significant negative coefficient of DID implies that firms connected to the 
opposition party experience a large drop in performance compared with firms connected to 
the incumbent party. The results from DID confirm our findings that politically connected 
firms are likely to underperform when their patron party falls from power.
Finally, given that CEO tribal connections with the President can affect the conse-
quences of any political connections, it is plausible that board members’ tribal connections 
could also influence our findings. Therefore, in columns 6–7 of Table  8, we control for 
board members’ tribal connections to mitigate any potential effect of omitted variable bias. 
3 PDP lost power in the 2015 election and became the major opposition party.
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The results remain the same as the main findings that the effects of political connections on 
firm value differs depending on whether the political party in government.
5.3  Additional analyses and robustness tests
5.3.1  Financial versus non‑Financial firms
Brown and Huang (2017) argue that firms with more exposure to government regulations 
and policies are more likely to seek political access and hence expected to benefit more 
from political connections. Ferris et al. (2016) found that firms with political connections 
are more likely to avoid regulatory delays in acquisition and mergers. Therefore, we cat-
egorized our sample into highly regulated or financial firms (49 firms) and less-regulated 
firms or non-financial firms (95 firms). Financial firms include banks, insurances, and 
credit providers operating within the ambit of numerous laws and policies; others were 
classified as less regulated or non-financial firms.
The results in Table 9 show that political connections are more beneficial to financial 
firms, especially when their patron party is in power. However, the negative impact of 
political connections is non-trivial when financial firms are connected to the wrong party. 
This implies that the incumbent government does provide some regulatory relief for finan-
cial firms. In contrast, firms connected to the opposition party are likely to be challenged 
on regulations by the incumbent government.
Table 9  Financial and non-financial firms
This table presents regression results for sub-samples of financial (highly regulated) and non-financial firms 
(less regulated). PIP–companies connected to the party in power. OPP—companies connected to the main 
opposition party. Political –Proportion of directors who are affiliated with a political party. Political*PIP—
interaction term between political connection and companies connected with party in power (PIP). 
Political*OPP—interaction term between political connection and companies connected with opposition 
party (OPP). t-Statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively
Financial firms Non-Financial firms
2011–2014 PDP term 2015–2018 APC term 2011-2014PDP term 2015-2018APC term
Variable PIP OPP PIP OPP PIP OPP PIP OPP

















































Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj.R 0.271 0.283 0.233 0.219 0.283 0.265 0.196 0.187
Observations 196 196 196 196 380 380 380 380
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5.3.2  Sample selection and survival bias
Although balanced data has the advantage of mitigating attrition bias, it is likely to cre-
ate sample selection and survival bias (Gujarati and Porter 2008; Wooldridge 2010). For 
instance, sample selection bias arises due to the specification of certain criteria for select-
ing the firms (Shehata 1991). Hence our selection of firms with full data over the 8 years 
could create sample selection bias. Also, the selection of only firms that existed through-
out the 8 years eliminated firms that ceased operations or delisted, creating survival bias. 
Therefore, to address the issues of selection and survival bias, we perform an additional 
test that includes additional 18 firms not included in the initial balanced panel dataset. 
Those firms ceased operations and delisted or emerged at some point in the sample period. 
The results presented in Table 10 are not significantly different from the main results in 
Table 6, hence our results do not suffer from sample selection and survival bias.
5.3.3  The effect of firm size and growth
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that firms are likely to differ significantly in size 
(measured by total assets) and growth rate (measured by sale growth). We have mitigated 
Table 10  Accounting for 
selection bias (unbalance panel 
data)
This table presents the regression results on the impact of politi-
cal connection with the party in power and opposition party on firm 
performance using unbalanced panel data. PIP—companies con-
nected to the party in power. OPP—companies connected to the main 
opposition party. Political–Proportion of directors who are affili-
ated with a political party. Political*PIP—interaction term between 
political connection and companies connected with party in power 
(PIP). Political*OPP—interaction term between political connec-
tion and companies connected with opposition party (OPP). Total 
Assets—Total assets of the company measured in Billions of Nara. 
Sales growth—Proportionate change in sales from year to year. Lev-
erage—total debt to total assets. Board size—Number of directors on 
the board. Non-executive—Number of non-executive directors on the 
board. t-Statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote sta-
tistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively

































Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj.R 0.211 0.201 0.241 0.233
Observations 611 611 473 473
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Table 11  The effect of firm size and growth
This table presents the regression results on the impact of political connection with the party in power 
and opposition party on firm performance based on size and sales growth. Panel A contains results based 
on firm size. Large firms are firms with total assets above the mean assets value of the sample compa-
nies. Small firms are firms with total assets below the mean value of assets of the sample companies. High 
growth is firms with sales growth above the mean sales growth of the sample companies. Low growth is 
firms with sales growth below the mean sales growth of the sample companies. PIP –companies connected 
to the party in power. OPP—companies connected to the main opposition party. Multiple—companies that 
have political connections with more than one political party. Political–Proportion of directors who are 
affiliated with a political party. Political*PIP—interaction term between political connection and compa-
nies connected with party in power (PIP). Political*OPP—interaction term between political connection 
and companies connected with opposition party (OPP). Political*MUT—interaction term between political 
Panel A—large vs. small firms
Large firms Small firms
Variable PIP OPP MUT PIP OPP MUT





































Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry&Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R 0.467 0.457 0.412 0.386 0.399 0.379
Observations 544 544 544 608 608 608
Panel B—high vs. low growth firms
High growth firms Low growth firms
Variable PIP OPP MUT PIP OPP MUT





































Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R 0.347 0.342 0.351 0.401 0.423 0.407
Observations 456 456 456 696 696 696
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the effect of these factors on our results by including total assets and sale growth in the 
model. However, to further alleviate the concern of potential bias for bigger and faster 
growth firms, we perform an additional test using split sampling techniques. To do this, 
we separate the firms into large firms and small firms based on the average total assets 
value over the sample period. A firm is either classified as a large firm if its average total 
assets above the mean value of the full sample, or a small firm otherwise. Next, we run a 
separate regression for both large and small firms. The results are presented in Panel A of 
Table  11. In both groups, the results indicate that political connection has a differential 
impact on firm value depending on the status of the political party, and this confirms our 
main findings.
Regarding firm growth, we group firms based on average sales growth. A firm is clas-
sified as either high growth if its average sales growth is higher than mean sales growth or 
low growth otherwise. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 11. Similar to that of 
firm size, our results remain qualitatively similar to the main findings, suggesting that our 
results are not endogenous to firm size and growth.
connection and companies connected with multiple parties (MUT). t-Statistics are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
Table 11  (continued)
Table 12  The effect of switching or connecting with party in power
This table presents the regression results on the impact of switching political connections to a party in 
power or having a new connection with the party when in power. Political–Proportion of directors who 
are affiliated with a political party. Switch is binary variable equal to 1 for firms that switch to or connected 
with party in power or 0 otherwise. Political*Switch is an interaction term between Political and Switch. 
t-Statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively


























Control Yes Yes Yes
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes
Year effect Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R 0.334 0.328 0.341
Observations 1152 576 576
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5.3.4  A switch to or connection with party in power
In this section, we test whether firms that switch to, or were connected with, a party when 
the party was in power enhance firm performance. To do this, we introduce a new vari-
able, Switch, to capture firms that switch or connect with the party during their government 
term. Switch is a binary variable equal to either 1 for firms that switch or are connected 
with the party in power or 0 if otherwise. Those include firms that did not have a political 
connection with the party in power and begin appointing directors connected with the party 
in power. Next, we interact Switch with Political connection (Political*Switch), which 
becomes our variable of interest. The results are presented in Table 12. The positive and 
significant coefficient of the interaction term (Political*Switch) indicates that the parties 
that switch to or connect with the party in power experience increased firm performance. 
This result provides further confirmation to the main findings that political connections 
with the party in power is beneficial.
6  Conclusion
Prior studies show that political connections generally add value to firms. However, it 
is not clear whether political connections are still valuable in a highly partisan political 
environment, even when the affiliated political party is in opposition. To fill this gap in 
the literature, we examine the impact of political connections on firm value in a highly 
partisan political environment of Nigeria. We tested our hypotheses by sorting firms that 
are connected to two different political parties (PDP and APC) and analyze the value of 
these connections to firm performance over eight years of 2011–2018. Using both binary 
and proportionate measures of directors’ political connections, our results are threefold. 
First, approximately 60% of listed firms have politically connected directors on their board, 
whether a former minister, member of parliament, national party office, or government 
appointee at the national level. Most of the firms were connected to either party in power or 
the main opposition party. Second, we find that political connections increased firm perfor-
mance. However, our main analysis on the lines of the status of the political party reveals 
that political connections are more value relevant if the political party of the connected 
person is in government.
On the contrary, connections with the opposition are likely to reduce firm value. Thus, 
political connections in a partisan environment can be a good partnership at the wrong 
timing. Third, although it is generally perceived that tribalism hampers economic growth 
and success of a business, we find that firms can use tribal connections with the Presi-
dent to mitigate the negative impact of political connection when their patron party is in 
opposition. Specifically, a CEO tribal connection with the President has a significant posi-
tive impact on firm performance regardless of the company’s political connection with any 
party.
Our study makes a number of new contributions to the existing literature as well as 
offers considerations for policy makers, regulatory authorities, and managers. First, this 
study is important in enhancing our understanding of the value relevance of political con-
nections in a partisan political economy. It also gives compelling empirical evidence on 
the timing effect of political connection on firm performance. The evidence suggests that 
a politically connected person is useful when their political party is in power. However, 
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having an opposition political party member on the board of directors is likely to reduce 
the firm’s value, especially in a highly partisan political environment. Second, we provide 
empirical evidence that tribalism is likely to transcend the boundaries of political party 
affiliation; thus, the ethnic similarity between firm and government is still relevant because 
firms can offset the downside of opposition party connection if their CEO has a tribal con-
nection with the President. Finally, our findings also indicate that for a stable political con-
nection that yields a continuous positive value, a company must have people from different 
political parties because it reduces the stereotyping behavior of the public towards partisan 
politicians.
Although the current study focused on Nigeria, the findings are applicable to other 
countries where tribalism dominate politics and partisan politics is important in busi-
ness relationships. Most developing countries and Africa, in particular, bear these char-
acteristics, hence these results are applicable. For example, in the case of Ghana, the two 
dominating parties are built along tribal lines. The NPP is perceived to be Asantes, while 
the NDC is known to be Eves and Northerns. A similar pattern is noticeable in Kenya, 
Rwanda, etc. In Asia, Collins (2004) demonstrates the significance of tribal connection 
in many countries’ political environments. Tribal connections are deeply intertwined with 
political relations in many middle eastern countries such as Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen (Inter-
national Development Research Centre 2010). And the political connection is an essential 
ingredient for business operations. Therefore, our findings are applicable beyond the bor-
ders of Africa to many other developing countries. In summary, our findings apply to most 
countries where tribalism and partisan politics play an important role in the business envi-
ronment. By extension, we argue that some form of connections with the President other 
than the political tie help a firm mitigate the negative effect of having a political tie with 
the opposition party.
Despite the wide use of binary and proportionate measures of political connections 
in political science, finance, and accounting literature, these measures do not take into 
account the level of access that each politically connected person has with the government. 
Therefore, future studies can investigate how connections with politicians at different levels 
affect performance.
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